With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?
The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.
French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.
Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.
While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.
I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.
I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.
This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.
Three ways China could benefit
First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.
US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.
Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.
The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.
In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.
Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.
Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.
As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.
If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.
Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.
This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.
Third is Chinese arms sales.
Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.
The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.
Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.
For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.
In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.
Bumpy road ahead
China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.
There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.
This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.
It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.
Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Think Tank Initiative, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Coimbra Group Scholarship Programme, Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TetFund), Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF), American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program (ACLS-AHP), Merian Institute of Advanced Studies in Africa (MIASA), Development Studies Association (DSA) UK, Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA), Ford Foundation, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), and Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). However, I must clearly and strongly state that none of these funders have at any time sought to influence or influenced my writings or public engagement. Thus, this article is one of my many expressions of my academic freedom.
By Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University
