– Source:The governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda concluded a peace treaty in June 2025, aimed at ending a decades-long war in eastern DRC. The United Nations welcomed the agreement as “a significant step towards de-escalation, peace and stability” in the region.
I have analysed several different peace negotiations and agreements. It’s important to distinguish between what’s needed to get warring parties to the table, and what’s eventually agreed on. In this article, I examine whether the DRC-Rwanda deal has got the four essential components that usually signal that an agreement will hold.
Two broad points about peace agreements, first – and one particular complication in the DRC-Rwanda case.
Firstly, one agreement is rarely enough to resolve a complex conflict. Most deals are part of a series of agreements, sometimes between different actors. They often mention previously concluded ones, and will be referred to by subsequent ones.
Secondly, peace is a process, and requires broad and sustained commitment. It is essential that other actors, like armed groups, are brought on board. Importantly, this also includes civil society actors. An agreement will be more legitimate and effective if different voices are heard during negotiations.
One major complication in relation to the DRC-Rwanda deal is that the United States has been the prime broker. But rather than acting as a neutral mediator trying to bring about peace, Washington seems to be pursuing its own economic interests. This does not bode well.
There is no simple recipe for a good peace agreement, but research shows that four elements are important: a serious commitment from the parties, precise wording, clear timelines and strong implementation provisions.
What underpins a good agreement
First, the parties need to be serious about the agreement and able to commit to its terms. It must not be used as a cover to buy time, re-arm or pursue fighting. Moreover, lasting peace cannot be made exclusively at the highest political level. Agreements that are the result of more inclusive processes, with input by and support from the communities concerned, have a higher success rate.
Second, the agreement must address the issues it aims to resolve, and its provisions must be drafted carefully and unambiguously. When agreements are vague or silent on key aspects, they are often short-lived. Previous experiences can guide peace negotiators and mediators in the drafting process. Peace agreement databases established by the United Nations and academic institutions are a useful tool for this.
Third, clear and realistic timelines are essential. These can concern the withdrawal of armed forces from specified territories, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of mechanisms providing reparations or other forms of transitional justice.
Fourth, an agreement should include provisions on its implementation. External support is usually helpful here. Third states or international organisations, liked the United Nations and the African Union, can be mandated to oversee this phase. They can also provide security guarantees or even deploy a peacekeeping operation. What is crucial is that these actors are committed to the process and don’t pursue their own interests.
To know what to realistically expect from a specific peace agreement, it’s important to understand that such agreements can take very different forms. These range from pre-negotiation arrangements and ceasefires to comprehensive peace accords and implementation agreements.
A lasting resolution of the conflict should not be expected when only a few conflict parties have concluded a temporary ceasefire.
The DRC-Rwanda agreement: an important step with lots of shortcomings
It’s difficult to tell at this point how serious the DRC and Rwanda are about peace, and if their commitment will be enough.
Their assertion that they will respect each other’s territory and refrain from acts of aggression is certainly important.
But Rwanda has a history of direct military activities in the DRC since the 1990s. And the treaty only includes rather vague references to the “disengagement of forces/lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda”. It doesn’t specifically mention the withdrawal of the reportedly thousands of Rwandan troops deployed to eastern DRC.
The Paul Kagame-led Rwandan government has also supported Tutsi-dominated armed groups in the DRC since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) is the current primary military actor in eastern DRC. But the agreement between the governments of DRC and Rwanda didn’t include the M23 or other groups. The two governments only commit themselves to supporting the ongoing negotiations between the DRC and the M23 facilitated by Qatar.
The agreement also foresees the “neutralisation” of another armed group, the Hutu-dominated Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This group claims to protect Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC, but is considered “genocidal” by the Rwandan government. The group has reacted to this plan by calling for a political solution and a more inclusive peace process.
What’s needed
The DRC-Rwanda agreement includes provisions that are vital to the people most affected by the conflict, such as the return of the millions of people displaced because of the fighting in eastern DRC. But it does not address other key issues.
For instance, aside from a general commitment to promote human rights and international humanitarian law, there is no reference to the widespread violations of human rights and war crimes reportedly committed by all sides. These include summary executions, and sexual and gender-based violence, including violence against children.
Some form of justice and reconciliation mechanism to deal with such large-scale violence should be considered in this situation, as for instance in the fairly successful 2016 agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC). This could contribute to preventing further violations as it sends a clear signal that committing crimes will not be rewarded. It also helps the population heal and gives peace a better chance.
There is no single model for this, and so-called transitional justice (defined as the “range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”) remains highly controversial. For instance, insisting on war crimes trials can be seen as endangering a fragile peace process.
But peace agreements across the world, from Libya to the Central African Republic, have over past decades moved away from blanket amnesties. They have increasingly included provisions to ensure accountability, especially for serious crimes. The DRC-Rwanda deal is silent on these questions.
A twist in the tale
The DRC-Rwanda deal is complicated by Washington’s role and pursuit of economic interests.
The two states agreed to establish a joint oversight committee, with members of the African Union, Qatar and the United States. It foresees a “regional economic integration framework”, which has been criticised as opening the door for foreign influence in the DRC’s rich mineral resources. The country is the world’s largest producer of cobalt, for instance, which is essential for the renewable energy sector.
Such a neocolonial “peace for exploitation bargain” does not send a positive signal. And it will probably not contribute to ending an armed conflict that has been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.
Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
By Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western Australia
