Ethiopia and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 6 May 2025. Under it, their national police agencies will cooperate on security and intelligence. This will include combating cross-border crime, sharing intelligence and building capacity. They will also share experiences and training.
For Iran, the MOU marks a significant step towards strengthening relations with a regional power that’s strategically located in the Horn of Africa.
Tehran has been using its security apparatus and military capabilities to establish and expand political and economic ties with countries in Africa. This has included drone transfers to the Ethiopian government that helped it turned the tide of the Tigray war, a separatist struggle in the country’s north that took place from 2020 to 2022.
Iran has also supplied the Sudanese army with surveillance and combat drones. These have been used against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s ongoing civil war.
The agreement is important for Ethiopia for two reasons.
Firstly, it’s likely to enable the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa to combat ethnic militias more effectively. It faces increasing internal instability, including tensions with hostile factions of the separatist Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
Secondly, the agreement comes after a meeting in Addis Ababa between the Ethiopian police chief, Demelash Gebremichael, and a delegation from Iran’s regional rival, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The exchange concentrated on investigating and extraditing cross-border criminals.
Addis Ababa’s willingness to work with regional rivals in the Middle East shows its pragmatic approach to foreign relations. Ethiopia needs all the friends it can muster as an embattled and weakened state. Since the Tigray war, it has battled the rise of ethnic militias and confronted economic adversity. It is also facing renewed hostility with neighbouring Eritrea.
What Iran stands to gain
Since 2016, Ethiopia has been a gateway for Iran to gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa. That year, other countries in the region severed relations with Iran. This followed Tehran’s disengagement from sub-Saharan Africa under Hassan Rouhani, who served as president from 2005 to 2013, and his prioritisation of a nuclear deal with the US.
The severing of ties was also a byproduct of geopolitical pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on countries in the region. The Middle Eastern states wanted to reduce, if not eliminate, Iran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea to limit its support for Houthi rebels in the ongoing Yemeni civil war.
Ethiopia was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to establish relations with Iran during the 1960s. It was also one of its top trading partners on the continent before and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Strategically and ideologically, this special relationship was based on the pro-western and anti-communist stances of their monarchs: the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled from 1941 to 1979, and Emperor Haile Selassie, who was in power from 1930 to 1974.
After the revolution, Iran-Ethiopia relations revived under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as Iranian president from 2005 to 2013. He pursued an active Africa policy to mitigate Iran’s international isolation and circumvent US sanctions.
After Rouhani initially downgraded these relations, they were renewed during his second term. This followed US withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
Relations firmed when Ebrahim Raisi, who served as Iranian president from 2021 to 2024, delivered military drones and other aid to Addis Ababa during the Tigray war.
What’s in it for Ethiopia
Ethiopia is facing increasing instability and uncertainty. The Tigray war has depleted the state’s resources. There is an economic crisis caused by rising inflation and unemployment.
Addis Ababa continues to confront ethnic tensions. Hostile factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front remain. It also faces tensions with the Amhara Fano militia, which initially fought alongside the government against Tigrayan forces. Forced disarmament policies and ongoing land disputes caused the militia to take up arms against the government.
Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed also faces growing opposition and resistance from his own ethnic group, the majority Oromo, and their Oromo Liberation Army. The reason for their discontent is Abiy’s imposition of centralised rule on their regional state within a federal system.
The security and intelligence cooperation with Iran could allow Addis Ababa to combat ethnic militias more effectively.
It would also enable Ethiopia to prepare for another possible war against neighbouring Eritrea.
Ethiopia and Eritrea normalised relations and fought together against Tigrayan forces. However, tensions between the two countries have been brewing again. These have been triggered by two factors. First, the conditions of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement caused Eritrea to maintain forces inside Ethiopia. Second are the ambitions of Addis Ababa to acquire a Red Sea port in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia. Eritrea has supported Somalia’s opposition to the deal.
Regional power games
This isn’t the first time that Ethiopia has tried working with two regional rivals – Iran and the UAE. The UAE is also among its top trading partners, along with Saudi Arabia.
In 2016, Ethiopia was the only country in the Horn of Africa that didn’t cut ties with Iran, though it was under pressure from the UAE and Saudi Arabia to do so. The decision was taken by Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, whose term ran from 2012 to 2018.
During the Tigray war, Ethiopia received military drones and other assistance from Iran and the UAE, alongside Turkey.
The civil war in Sudan has presented an even more complicated story. Ethiopia has vacillated between engaging with the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces at different points in the conflict.
For its part, Iran has supported the Sudanese army. The UAE has backed the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
Ethiopia’s efforts to strengthen its security ties with Iran and the UAE show a unique case of convergence between regional rivals that have otherwise remained on opposite sides of conflicts in countries like Yemen and Sudan.
Eric Lob does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University
