
The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.
At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.
This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.
The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.
More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Several actors have taken sides.
Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea reportedly support the paramilitary group. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.
These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.
I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.
The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.
For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.
The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.
The African Union
The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.
Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.
First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.
Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.
Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.
Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.
The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.
The United Arab Emirates
The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.
Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.
In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.
In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”
The United States
During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.
The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.
However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.
The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.
But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.
The European Union
The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.
Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.
The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.
A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.
What now?
To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.
Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.
John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University