Collins Tetteh AbeniAbstract
The Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana stands at the critical intersection of democratic consolidation and partisan contestation. This paper examines the paradoxical phenomenon whereby ruling governments consistently endorse EC actions while opposition parties and some civil societies routinely challenge its decisions. Through mixed-method analysis of electoral governance frameworks, institutional design, political economy factors, and case studies of recent elections, the author demonstrates how structural incentives—rather than inherent institutional bias—drive this perception gap. Our findings reveal that constitutional ambiguities in appointment procedures, resource dependencies, and Ghana’s competitive clientelist political settlement systematically undermine perceived EC neutrality. We propose evidence-based institutional reforms to strengthen electoral integrity and bridge the trust deficit in one of Africa’s most resilient democracies.
INTRODUCTION
The Paradox of Partisan Perception
The Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana represents a critical institutional pillar in one of Africa’s most stable democracies. Established under Article 43 of the 1992 Constitution and operationalized through the Electoral Commission Act (Act 451) of 1993, the EC constitutionally enjoys functional and administrative independence . Since overseeing Ghana’s transition to multi-party democracy in 1992, the EC has administered eight successful elections featuring four peaceful transfers of power between the two dominant parties—the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) . Despite these institutional achievements, a persistent partisan perception gap has emerged: ruling governments consistently endorse EC decisions while opposition parties and civil society organizations routinely challenge its impartiality .
This paradox presents a critical puzzle for democratic theory and practice. How does an institution constitutionally mandated to be independent become enmeshed in partisan contestation? Why does the perception gap persist despite continuous electoral management improvements? This paper argues that structural incentives within political settlement of Ghana, not inherent EC partiality, drive this phenomenon. The author examines three interconnected dimensions: (1) constitutional-design tensions in EC appointment and resourcing; (2) the political economy of competitive clientelism; and (3) asymmetric accountability expectations between governing and opposition coalitions.
The analysis draws on electoral observation reports, parliamentary proceedings, court cases, IPAC records (2012–2024), and interviews with EC officials across three administrative eras. The evidence reveals systemic vulnerabilities that demand institutional re-engineering to preserve democratic exceptionalism of Ghana in a region experiencing democratic backsliding.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Institutional Credibility in Competitive Clientelist Systems
Electoral management bodies globally face the “impossible credibility” dilemma—simultaneously pressured by incumbents to enable governability and by oppositions to ensure contestability. In competitive clientelist system of Ghana, where “elections are auctions of state resources” , this tension intensifies through three theoretical lenses:
1. Principal-Agent Complexity: The EC serves multiple principals—the constitution, voters, political parties—with divergent expectations. Ruling parties prioritize electoral efficiency; oppositions emphasize procedural contestability .
2. Political Settlement Theory: Ghana’s “competitive clientelism” drives political elites to instrumentalize state institutions for resource distribution. Electoral processes become arenas for rent-seeking, exemplified by illegal gold mining (galamsey) financing campaigns .
3. Asymmetric Institutional Legitimacy: Incumbents derive institutional trust from electoral victory; oppositions must challenge institutional processes to legitimize their political existence .
These frameworks explain why perception gaps emerge irrespective of actual EC performance—a dynamic observed across electoral democracies globally yet acutely manifested in Ghana’s institutional context.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITIES
Appointment Ambiguities
Article 70(2) of the Constitution of Ghana empowers the president to appoint EC members “acting on the advice of the Council of State.” While appointees require parliamentary approval, the process lacks:
Transparency criteria for selection Opposition veto mechanisms Staggered terms to prevent complete membership turnover after elections
This creates a persistent perception of executive capture. Since 1993, all EC chairpersons have been appointed by the sitting president: Kwadwo Afari-Gyan (NDC), Charlotte Osei (NDC), and Jean Mensa (NPP) . The contentious dismissal of Charlotte Osei in 2018 and subsequent NPP-aligned appointments fueled opposition accusations of institutional capture .
Resource Dependencies
Despite constitutional guarantees that EC expenses “be chargeable to the Consolidated Fund” (Article 54), budgetary allocations remain subject to executive influence. EC expenditure surged during election years (GH¢822 million in 2016) yet faced government delays in disbursement . This creates operational vulnerabilities that opposition parties interpret as evidence of executive leverage.
Management Architecture
The structure of the EC combines technical departments (Electoral Services, IT) with regional/district offices. However, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system amplifies perceptions of bias through:
Winner-takes-all outcomes marginalizing third parties Gerrymandering suspicions in constituency demarcation Centralized results collation vulnerable to mistrust
Table 1 shows the design of electoral system of Ghana and its related perception problems.
Table 1: Electoral System Design and Perception Challenges
Feature Legal Basis Perception Impact Presidential Appointment Article 70(2) Executive influence concerns First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) System Article 47 Marginalizes minorities Consolidated Fund Funding Article 54 Disbursement delays IPAC Consultations EC Regulation Limited decision-binding power
Source: Author
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE
Competitive Clientelism and Resource Extraction
The intense bipartisanship of Ghana fuels what Bebbington et al. term “political settlement through resource rents.” Illegal gold mining (galamsey)—constituting about 85% of Artisanal Small-scale gold Mining (ASM) activity—finances campaign expenditures exceeding GH¢1.1 billion in 2024 . Field evidence reveals,
“Both the NDC and NPP district executives receive weekly payments from galamsey operators. Military crackdowns coincide not with environmental concerns but with election cycles when parties reassert territorial control (Abdulai, Buur & Stacey (2025).”
This illicit financing creates perverse incentives: ruling parties protect EC decisions enabling their resource access; oppositions attack EC collusion with illegal mining (Abdulai, Buur & Stacey (2025).
Asymmetric Accountability
Ruling parties perceive EC through governability imperatives:
Efficient voter registration Timely result declaration Electoral stability maintenance
Oppositions prioritize contestability safeguards:
Voter register auditability Results collation transparency Dispute resolution accessibility
These divergent expectations generate incompatible credibility benchmarks. The 2020 election exemplifies this: the ruling NPP praised the EC’s efficient declaration; the NDC litigated over 45 alleged irregularities .
CASE ANALYSIS:
Perception Gap Manifestations
Voter Registration Controversies (2020–2024)
The EC’s 2020 new voter register proposal sparked divergent reactions:
NPP Government: Supported digitization to “enhance electoral integrity” NDC Opposition: Challenged it as “disenfranchisement targeting opposition strongholds” Civil Society: Divided between electoral reformers (supporting) and human rights groups (opposing)
Despite receiving approval from the Supreme Court, the process highlighted how technical decisions can become entangled with political partisanship in highly polarized environments. This phenomenon was evident in various instances where legal interpretations were scrutinized through a partisan lens. For example, in a recent case involving a controversial policy decision, the court’s ruling was immediately seized upon by opposing political factions to further their own agendas. This, not only underscored the contentious nature of legal proceedings, but also showcased how even seemingly apolitical issues can be weaponized for political gain.
The intersection of technical expertise and political ideology was further exacerbated by the media’s portrayal of the Supreme Court’s decision. News outlets with differing political leanings framed the ruling in contrasting ways, further deepening societal divisions. This media coverage, not only shaped public perception, but also influenced the discourse surrounding the court’s legitimacy and impartiality. As a result, what should have been a straightforward legal process became mired in controversy and public scrutiny.
Moreover, the polarized environment surrounding technical decisions has far-reaching implications for the functioning of democratic institutions. When legal judgments are viewed through a partisan prism, the integrity of the judicial system is called into question, eroding public trust in the rule of law. This erosion of trust can have cascading effects on the stability and legitimacy of the entire legal framework, creating a ripple effect that extends beyond individual cases.
The approval of the Supreme Court does not exist in a vacuum but is instead ensnared in the intricate web of political polarization. As technical decisions continue to acquire partisan valence, it becomes imperative for society to reflect on the broader implications of this phenomenon and strive towards a more balanced and impartial approach to legal interpretation. Only through a concerted effort to depoliticize technical decisions can we safeguard the integrity of our legal institutions and uphold the principles of justice and fairness for all.
Affirmative Action Implementation (2024 Elections)
The 2024 Affirmative Action Act mandated parties to achieve 30% female candidacy by 2026. Despite EC enforcement efforts:
Only 15% of elected MPs were women (up from 13%) NDC achieved 16% female MPs; NPP 11%
Ruling coalitions highlighted incremental progress; feminist groups decried the EC’s “leniency” on non-compliance—illustrating how structural barriers become framed as EC failures.
Institutional Credibility Enhancement Framework
Bridging the perception gap requires institutional redesign beyond technical capacity building. I propose a three-pillar framework:
1. Appointment Reforms
Staggered Terms (7-year non-renewable terms for commissioners, with one member exiting biennially):
In the context of organizational governance, staggered terms refer to a specific structure implemented for commissioners. These terms typically span over a period of 7 years and are non-renewable, meaning that once a commissioner’s term expires, they cannot be reappointed or continue serving in that capacity. The unique aspect of staggered terms lies in the biennial exit of one member, ensuring a continuous rotation within the commission.
For instance, imagine a scenario where a commission consists of seven members, each appointed for a 7-year term. With staggered terms in place, every two years, one commissioner steps down, creating a cyclical pattern of renewal and change within the governing body. This system helps maintain a balance of experience and fresh perspectives, preventing stagnation and promoting diversity of thought.
Moreover, the implementation of staggered terms serves to uphold institutional memory and continuity. By having commissioners exit at different intervals, there is always a blend of seasoned members and newcomers, fostering a dynamic environment for decision-making and policy development. This approach also mitigates the risk of a complete turnover of the commission at once, ensuring stability and consistency in governance practices.
Staggered terms offer a strategic framework for managing commissioner appointments, ensuring a gradual turnover of members over time. This structured approach not only promotes sustainability and diversity within the commission but also facilitates effective leadership transitions and the preservation of institutional knowledge.
Multipartisan Committee (Parliamentary approval of appointments (2/3 majority following nominations):
A Multipartisan Committee must be responsible for making Parliamentary appointments approvals through a process that requires a 2/3 majority vote following one’s nominations. This means that individuals from various political parties definitely will have to come together to select and approve of a nominee for key positions such as EC Chair or Commissioner.
Thus, in order to achieve a 2/3 majority, members of the committee must engage in constructive dialogue and negotiation to find common ground. They may need to compromise on certain issues or priorities in order to secure the necessary votes. This collaborative approach will help to foster a spirit of cooperation and unity within the Parliament, leading to more effective decision-making and governance.
Overall, the Multipartisan Committee will play a crucial role in ensuring that approval of appointments are made in a fair and democratic manner, reflecting the exact will of the people. By requiring a 2/3 majority, the committee, to a larger extent, will uphold high standards of accountability and consensus-building, ultimately strengthening the integrity of the parliamentary system.
Performance Benchmarks (Transparent evaluation metrics published pre-confirmation):
Performance benchmarks are crucial indicators used to measure the success and efficiency of various processes or systems. When these benchmarks are transparent, it means that the evaluation metrics used to assess performance are openly shared with stakeholders before any official confirmation or decision-making takes place. This transparency fosters trust and accountability within organizations.
In the context of electoral management, transparent performance benchmarks could include metrics such as Voter Register Accuracy (e.g., percentage of verified biometric entries, removal of deceased/duplicate registrants), Procedural Compliance (e.g., adherence to constitutional timelines for voter registration, ballot paper procurement, and results declaration) and Stakeholder Trust Levels (e.g., pre/ post-election surveys measuring political parties’ and civil society’s confidence in EC decisions). By publishing these metrics at each phase of the electoral cycle – and making them accessible to political parties, observer groups, and the public before finalizing critical processes like constituency demarcation or results certification – the Electoral Commission will ensure all electoral stakeholders share:
A common evidentiary basis for evaluating institutional performance, Clarity on accountability standards, Objective mechanisms to verify impartiality.
Indicated in Table 2 are cardinal standards and the rationale behind them.
Table 2: Key Benchmarks and Rationale
Electoral Commission’s Benchmark Purpose Voter Register Accuracy Voter Register Accuracy Procedural Compliance Procedural Compliance Stakeholder Trust Levels Stakeholder Trust Levels
Source: Author
Implications and Applications
Before the 2024 Elections, Ghana’s EC could have published:
Biometric verification failure rates per region Timeline compliance reports from IPAC meetings Afrobarometer trust survey data
If it was done this way, it would have mitigated opposition claims of opacity (e.g., 2020 NDC litigation over register “inflation”) while giving civil society objective criteria for evaluation.
Academic Support
This approach aligns with global electoral integrity frameworks. According to Norris (2014), “The publication of disaggregated performance data before electoral decisions transforms normative accountability into measurable compliance.” Moreover, transparency benchmarks reduce information asymmetry between Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and stakeholders, lowering conflict risks (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002).
The EC of Ghana could implement or achieve these by adopting tools such as:
Digital Dashboard: Real-time publication of metrics at [ec.gov.gh/transparency](https://ec.gov.gh) IPAC Scorecards: Quarterly graded assessments of EC performance against agreed indicators Audited Pre-Election Reports: Independent verification by the Ghana Audit Service
This reframing will transform abstract transparency principles into actionable electoral governance mechanisms – a critical need in Ghana’s contested democratic landscape.
Moreover, publishing evaluation metrics pre-confirmation allows for early identification of potential issues or areas needing improvement. This proactive approach will enable stakeholders to address concerns promptly and make necessary adjustments to ensure a success pre-election, election and post-election processes.
The practice of publishing transparent performance benchmarks pre-confirmation is a valuable strategy for promoting openness, collaboration, and continuous improvement within organizations. By sharing evaluation metrics openly, stakeholders can work towards common objectives with clarity and accountability.
Fiscal Autonomy Mechanisms Direct Consolidated Fund Access (Removal of treasury intermediation):
Direct Consolidated Fund Access is a strategic initiative aimed at streamlining the process of accessing funds without the need for treasury intermediation. This approach simplifies and expedites the disbursement of funds for various purposes. By eliminating the involvement of treasury intermediaries, such as banks or financial institutions, the access to funds becomes more direct and efficient.
Currently, when the EC needs funds from the government, it has to go through multiple layers of approval and processing, including dealing with treasury intermediaries. This often lead to delays and bureaucratic hurdles. However, with Direct Consolidated Fund Access, the institution can now access funds more quickly and conveniently, enabling it to carry out its activities without unnecessary delays.
Furthermore, by removing treasury intermediation, the risk of mismanagement or misuse of funds is reduced. Direct access to the consolidated fund will ensure greater transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. This will not only benefits the EC receiving the funds but also enhances overall financial governance and control.
Further, Direct Consolidated Fund Access will also offer a more efficient and transparent way for the commission to access funds without the need for treasury intermediation. This streamlined process will not only save time and resources but also promote better financial management practices. By embracing this approach, organizations can experience smoother fund disbursement and improved accountability in their financial operations.
Audited Election Fund (Multidonor basket fund managed by EC and quarterly audit):
The Audited Election Fund is a multidonor basket fund that is effectively managed by the Election Commission (EC) and undergoes quarterly audits to ensure transparency and accountability. This fund plays a crucial role in supporting various aspects of the electoral process, such as voter education, training of election officials, and the procurement of necessary materials like ballot boxes and voting booths.
In a recent audit report, it was highlighted that the funds allocated for voter education were utilized efficiently to conduct workshops, produce informative materials, and run public awareness campaigns (Auditor-General of Ghana, 2023). Additionally, the audit revealed that the procurement procedures followed for election-related materials were in line with the established guidelines, ensuring fair and competitive pricing.
Furthermore, the quarterly audits not only serve as a means to verify the proper utilization of funds but also provide an opportunity to identify any potential irregularities or discrepancies that may require further investigation. This proactive approach helps to maintain the integrity of the fund and instills confidence in both donors and the public regarding the management of electoral finances.
The Audited Election Fund, with its rigorous auditing process and strategic allocation of resources, plays a pivotal role in promoting transparency and accountability in electoral activities. By ensuring that the funds are utilized effectively and in accordance with the intended purposes, this fund contributes to the overall credibility and fairness of the electoral process.
Fixed Election Budget Formula (Constitutionally mandate 0.5% of prior year’s revenue):
The Fixed Election Budget Formula is a crucial mechanism that if enshrined in the constitution will require allocating a certain percentage, say 0.5% of the revenue generated in the previous year towards election expenses. This rule will ensure a fair and transparent process by setting a specific percentage that must be dedicated to funding elections. For example, if the country’s revenue in the prior year was $100 million, then $500,000 would be earmarked for election purposes.
By mandating a fixed percentage, the government of Ghana can plan and budget for elections effectively, preventing overspending or underspending on crucial democratic processes. This formula will also promote financial accountability and prevent misuse of funds, as the allocation is based on a clear and standardized calculation. Additionally, it will guarantee that sufficient resources are allocated for the smooth conduct of elections, including voter education, polling station setup, and ballot printing.
Moreover, the Fixed Election Budget Formula shall promote stability and consistency in election financing, ensuring that political parties and candidates have equal access to resources. This approach will help level the playing field and reduces the influence of money in politics, ultimately strengthening the democratic process. In summary, the constitutionally mandated 0.5% allocation of prior year’s revenue for election budgets will play a pivotal role in upholding democratic principles and ensuring the integrity of electoral processes.
3. Contestability Infrastructure
Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) Statutory Powers:
The country must seek to convert the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) from advisory to binding decision-making on the EC. The IPAC was established by the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana in 1994 as an informal, non-statutory body to address opposition boycotts and build consensus among political parties after the disputed 1992 elections. It facilitates advisory role. Thus, it proposes reforms (e.g., Ghana’s 2000 Code of Conduct for Parties) as well as promoting conflict mitigation by way of investigating complaints and reducing election-related tensions. It also ensures technical collaboration ( oversees ballot design, voter-register audits, and technology adoption). Despite, all these, the recommendations of IPAC (in its current state) are non-binding; its effectiveness hinges on the Electoral Commission’s willingness to implement decisions. Lack of legal enforcement mechanisms significaantly weakens its authority.
It is therefore proposed that IPAC be given statutory powers. The proposal aims to enhance the role of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) by transitioning it from a mere advisory body to a decision-making entity with binding authority, particularly concerning electoral calendars and procurement processes. This shift in power would empower IPAC to enforce its recommendations and decisions, ensuring greater accountability and transparency in political activities. In that case, IPAC could have the authority to set specific deadlines for electoral processes, such as candidate registration or campaign finance reporting, to streamline and regulate the electoral timeline effectively. Additionally, in procurement matters, IPAC could play a pivotal role in overseeing the fairness and integrity of procurement processes, safeguarding against corruption and favoritism. By granting IPAC statutory powers, there would be a clear legal framework that mandates compliance with its directives, ultimately strengthening democratic governance and upholding the rule of law.
Parallel Vote Tabulation (Mandatory citizen-led tally verification):
Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) is a crucial process that involves mandatory citizen-led tally verification during elections. PVT can serve as a method to ensure the accuracy and transparency of election results. In a PVT system, trained citizens will be tasked with the responsibility of independently counting and verifying the votes cast in polling stations to cross-check the official results released by electoral authorities, particularly, when there happens to be a controversy after counting by the EC officials.
This citizen-led tally verification process shall play a significant role in enhancing the credibility of election outcomes. By involving citizens in the verification process, PVT will help to detect any potential irregularities or discrepancies in the vote count. Moreover, it shall promote trust and confidence in the electoral process among the general public.
In countries such as the Philippines (1984/1986), Chile (1988), Panama (1989), Bulgaria (1990), Nicaragua (1990), Zambia (1991, 2015, 2016, 2021), Georgia (2016, 2021) and Armenia (2018)) where PVT is implemented, citizens are trained on how to accurately tally and report the election results. This training equips them with the necessary skills to effectively carry out their verification duties. Additionally, PVT initiatives often collaborate with local civil society organizations to ensure the integrity and impartiality of the process.
Overall, the mandatory citizen-led tally verification through Parallel Vote Tabulation is a fundamental component of ensuring fair and transparent electoral processes. It will empower citizens to actively participate in safeguarding the integrity of elections and upholding democratic principles. Through PVT, citizen will contribute to the promotion of free and fair elections, ultimately strengthening the democratic fabric of their societies.
Artisanal Small-scale gold Mining (ASM) Formalization (Link mining licenses to transparent party financing):
In the realm of Artisanal Small-scale gold Mining (ASM) formalization, a crucial aspect that will gain prominence is the connection between mining licenses and transparent party financing. This linkage will play a pivotal role in ensuring accountability and integrity within the mining sector. By tethering mining licenses to transparent party financing, governments and regulatory bodies can effectively monitor and regulate the flow of funds within the industry.
In countries (Brazil, Norway, etc) where such measures have been implemented, there has been a noticeable decrease in corruption and illicit financial activities related to mining operations. This is because transparent party financing mechanisms create a level playing field for all stakeholders involved, reducing the likelihood of under-the-table deals and unethical practices.
Moreover, by enforcing transparency in party financing, governments can enhance public trust and confidence in the mining sector. When citizens are aware of how mining licenses are linked to party financing, they can hold both companies and political entities accountable for their actions. This will lead to a more ethical and sustainable mining industry that benefits both the economy and the environment.
The formalization of ASM through the linkage of mining licenses to transparent party financing is a critical step towards promoting good governance and accountability in the mining sector. By fostering transparency and accountability, governments can create a more sustainable and responsible mining industry that serves the interests of all stakeholders involved.
Table 3: Perception Gap Mitigation Framework
Perception Driver Reform Pillar Expected Outcome Executive appointment influence Staggered terms Reduced partisan alignment Resource constraints Direct funding access Operational independence Opposition mistrust Parallel vote tabulation Enhanced result credibility Illicit campaign financing Artisanal Small-scale gold Mining (ASM) formalization Reduced resource clientelism
Source: Author
CONCLUSION
Protecting Democracy’s Referee
The Electoral Commission of Ghana operates within a political ecosystem that structurally generates divergent partisan perceptions. Rather than evidence of institutional failure, this perception gap reflects the EC’s embeddedness within Ghana’s competitive clientelist democracy. However, unaddressed, these perceptions risk eroding the diffuse legitimacy essential for democratic stability.
The 2025 constitutional review process offers a historic opportunity to recalibrate electoral governance . By implementing staggered appointments, direct EC funding, and statutory IPAC powers, Ghana can build institutional resilience against polarization. Such reforms would position the EC not as a passive referee caught between partisan giants, but as an active custodian of electoral sovereignty.
As Ghana approaches its 2030 development milestones, electoral credibility remains the bedrock of democratic renewal. An EC perceived as legitimate by all contestant is not a technical necessity—it is Ghana’s democratic covenant with future generations.
Collins Tetteh Abeni, Offinso College of Education (0202233902/ 0261546102)
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