The current conditions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resemble the situation during the Second Congo War between 1998 and 2003. This resulted in millions of deaths, with neighbouring countries – especially Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi – playing a significant role.
The pan-African weekly The Continent has already raised alarms. A February 2025 cover features a cartoon referencing the 1884 Berlin Conference, but instead of colonial powers carving up the Congo, it depicts regional states dividing the country among themselves. Kristof Titeca, who has extensively studied the dynamics of conflict in the DRC, unpacks the interests of the key players.
The DRC
The M23 rebel group entered the outskirts of Bukavu, a city of 1.3 million in eastern DRC, in mid-February 2025. This happened two weeks after Goma, another city in the region, came under the control of M23 rebels. With support from the Rwandan army, M23 already controls vast territory in eastern DRC.
The current situation doesn’t look good for DRC president Felix Tshisekedi. The further M23 advances, the more it highlights the failure of his policies in eastern Congo and weakens his legitimacy. Notably, he was not physically present at a peace summit in Tanzania on the conflict in early February 2025. In the same month, he also called off peace talks in Paris at the last minute. On social media, videos are circulating of Congolese soldiers fleeing the towns they should be protecting.
Kinshasa is filled with rumours about internal political and military tensions: fears of a coup could have prevented Tshisekedi from travelling to the earlier peace talks. The president’s personal security is handled by an Israeli security firm, indicating the level of distrust towards his own security services.
As it stands, Kinshasa seems to have lost control over the situation in the east. Tshisekedi has largely pinned his hopes on international pressure. Yet, many international actors have expressed frustration with his erratic and sometimes unrealistic decisions in addressing the conflict. Tshisekedi has purchased new and sophisticated weapons instead of tackling the structural weaknesses of the army (such as widespread corruption). He also decided to collaborate with a wide range of armed groups under the “Wazalendo” banner to stop rebel forces.
Rwanda
In theory, M23 is fighting to protect the Rwandophone community in eastern Congo (particularly the Tutsi community). Under the Alliance Fleuve Congo – the political wing of the M23 rebellion – this goal later expanded into a broader national agenda aiming to overthrow the regime in Kinshasa.
Whether this will actually happen remains uncertain. What is, however, certain is that Rwanda’s interests mainly lie in the east of the country. These interests are a mix of political, economic and security factors – strongly rooted in history.
Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame in the past has publicly questioned the borders between Rwanda and Congo. This narrative on “Greater Rwanda” would mean extending Rwanda beyond its colonial borders. Access to resources plays a role in Rwanda’s presence in the DRC, as does (in)security.
Rwanda wants influence and control. This is where M23 plays a crucial role. In Kigali, the idea of eastern DRC as a “buffer zone” is openly used. This would mean having an armed actor, such as the M23, govern provinces in the eastern region to protect Rwanda’s political, security and economic interests.
Uganda
Shortly after the fall of Goma, neighbouring Uganda deployed around 1,000 additional troops to Congo. In private conversations with me, diplomats estimate the country already had between 3,000 and 7,000 troops in the DRC. Officially, Uganda is there to fight another rebel group – the Allied Democratic Forces, which is linked to the Islamic State. However, these newly deployed troops have been moving towards the M23 rebels.
Uganda has always played an ambiguous role in the conflict. On the one hand, it wants to continue joint military operations with the Congolese army against the Allied Democratic Forces. On the other hand, it cannot allow its long-standing “frenemy” Rwanda to be the only power exerting influence over eastern Congo and M23.
For the past 30 years, these two neighbouring countries have competed for control in eastern Congo – sometimes cooperating, but often in direct competition.
Like Rwanda, Uganda’s main export is gold, and just like Rwanda, the vast majority of this gold comes from eastern Congo.
Several prominent Ugandan political and military figures – including Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the head of the Ugandan army and son of the president – have openly voiced their support for M23 and questioned Congo’s borders. And shortly after M23 entered Bukavu, Muhoozi announced – again – an expansion of the Ugandan operation in DRC, threatening an attack in the town of Bunia in the eastern province of Ituri.
In the current context, the movement of Ugandan troops could be seen as a clear signal to Rwanda: this is our zone of influence. In doing so, the conflict concerningly starts to look like the Second Congo War when Uganda and Rwanda divided Congolese territory. Uganda claimed Ituri, while Rwanda claimed the North and South Kivu provinces.
Burundi
Burundian troops are present in Congo at the invitation of Kinshasa. Meanwhile, tensions between Burundi and Rwanda are rising. UN reports indicate that both Burundi and Rwanda have resumed supporting rebel groups against each other’s governments in eastern Congo. These reports also claim that the Rwandan army has issued direct orders to target Burundian soldiers in the region.
Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye has warned of an escalating regional war, and even suggested that Rwanda is planning to invade Burundi.
With the M23 entering Bukavu, the group is getting increasingly close to the Burundian border, increasing the country’s concerns of regional escalation.
International community
The risk of an escalation of the DRC conflict underscores a number of issues. Most obviously, any attempt to resolve the crisis needs to involve the regional countries involved.
It also shows the importance of international pressure on Rwanda. It is generally accepted by analysts that this pressure – such as a US$240 million aid cut by a variety of donors – played a key role in ending the 2012-2013 M23 conflict.
While actors such as the European Union and United States have firmly condemned Rwanda, this has materialised into little action. So far, Germany has suspended aid talks with Rwanda, and the United Kingdom has threatened to cut aid. Other than that, there has been no action – a striking difference from 2012-2013.
Given US president Donald Trump’s “America First” policy, eyes are on the European Union to take action. However, internal differences are so far making this difficult. Belgium has been pushing for sanctions, while France has been taking the lead in blocking these. France’s national interests are a key reason for this: Rwandan peacekeeping troops are key in Mozambique, where a major TotalEnergies gas project – worth US$20 billion – is on hold because of an ongoing insurgency.
Next steps
The structural weaknesses of the Tshisekedi government should not be used as an excuse by international actors to fail to pressure Rwanda. At the moment, there is a major risk of the violence in eastern DRC escalating to the region.
Further, there is already a major humanitarian crisis. Since the beginning of the year alone, more than 700,000 people in the DRC have been displaced by the M23 conflict. The World Health Organization has warned that a public health “nightmare” is unfolding. Since the fall of Goma, M23 has unlawfully ordered tens of thousands of displaced people to leave the camps around the city. To prevent a bigger regional humanitarian crisis, urgent action is therefore needed.
Kristof Titeca is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute (Brussels).
By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp
