Malawi is one of the most disaster-prone countries in Africa. In the past 15 years it has experienced 16 floods, one rainfall-related landslide, five storm-related disasters, and two severe droughts.
Since 2019, Malawi has declared several national disasters. This creates a sense of a country in permanent state of emergency. To make things worse, these climate-related disasters are increasing in frequency and severity. The damage to the economy, loss of life, and damage to health, transport systems and the environment are increasing.
In February 2023, Cyclone Freddy struck Malawi, causing floods and mudslides that killed more than 1,200 people and displaced 659,000. Over 900,000 people in Malawi were left without food for a prolonged time.
The cyclone caused US$800 million worth of damage in Malawi. It was the longest tropical cyclone the world had ever experienced, with winds of up to 270 kilometres per hour.
I am a political economy specialist who researches extreme weather events. Together with my co-author, Tione Mumbo Thindwa, I research how power is expressed during extreme weather disasters and what this means for the communities affected.
We set out to research how the different Malawian disaster institutions behaved during Cyclone Freddy. During this disaster, the government, humanitarian agencies and donor and cooperating agencies all had to work together to get relief to victims of the floods and mudslides (food and other essential items). Malawi’s Department of Disaster Management Affairs co-ordinated the disaster response.
We interviewed 25 people from these different organisations and consulted the Soche Hill community in Blantyre to find out what they thought of the disaster response. Soche Hill was severely affected, experiencing severe flash floods and landslides that ripped apart homes.
Our team also looked at “disaster politics” – how politics and the conditions in a country affect government responses to major disasters. Our research aimed to find out how floods and mudslides could be managed better, and what kind of political arrangements are needed to reduce disaster risks and problems in Malawi.
We found that disaster institutions are routinely caught unaware during emergencies. Communities who are totally reliant on different levels of government and humanitarian organisations for assistance during disasters are left in the lurch.
Beyond flood waters: when institutions are ‘caught unaware’
When increasingly frequent and intense floods are discussed, the focus is often on how well national governments are able to respond. But what’s often missing is an understanding of the policies and legal tools used by other institutions that intervene after disasters.
Our research showed that after Freddy, there was a descent into chaos. The major problems were:
Inadequate equipment: The Malawian defence force lacked appropriate helicopters to rescue people trapped by floods. One person we interviewed told us that it was only some time after Cyclone Freddy that defence force helicopters were budgeted for.
A failure to anticipate mudslides as a result of heavy rains: Weather forecasts focused on floods and not the movement of mud, which meant that disaster assistance was not immediately ready in areas hit by mudslides.
Not providing counselling for traumatised residents, and focusing only on providing food, water, blankets and other material goods. As one female victim at Soche Hill put it:
I am here, but who would want to live here after what happened? I am still traumatised and afraid.
After the cyclone, some people quickly rebuilt in the disaster areas with unsuitable materials. Others remained in camps, without support and in need of the basic essentials.
The wider failures
Disasters cannot be dealt with as standalone events. Responses must include planning by local authorities, investments in preventing disaster, and an anticipation of how disasters will affect impoverished people more than others.
Our research showed that several factors contributed to disaster institutions being unable to cope with the scale of the damage after Cyclone Freddy:
Disaster politics: These are the political factors affecting decision-making and coordination of disaster efforts at different levels. Disaster politics must focus on supporting people who are victims of disasters. If they don’t, institutions may find themselves working in a chaotic manner.
Political failures: These were varied. They included a politicised policy on relocating victims of disasters and confusion about the role of the military in leading rescue missions.
Underfunding: Donor agencies often fail to budget for flood emergencies. This means they cannot roll out disaster relief and broader support in a sustained and reliable way.
Poor policy and legal tools: These led to inaction. For example, it was not clear after Cyclone Freddy who was responsible for relocating people in areas that had been wiped out by mudslides, and who would fund this.
Community knowledge was undermined: This is critical in designing and facilitating appropriate disaster responses. We found that excluding communities from developing policies and pre-disaster planning meant that communities were not prepared for the cyclone and didn’t have a plan in place to recover afterwards.
Lack of accountability by government: Here we found that there were questions about transparency and information sharing that affected institutions and their responses, including what faith-based organisations and private citizens could or could not do. Respondents blamed this on a general lack of sufficient accountability for specific actions among government actors.
A lack of government funding: Competing priorities meant that not enough money was budgeted for disaster responses. This affected Department of Disaster Management Affairs offices on the ground the most.
A future direction
There’s no one-size-fits-all disaster response for a world affected by climate-related disasters. For low-income countries in Africa, disasters add another expenditure line for resources that would otherwise be allocated to other equally pressing sectors. At the same time, the changing nature and intensity of disasters means that urgent and innovative approaches are required.
Disaster politics must change. Institutions must begin to behave in a dynamic and adaptable way. Specifically, they must start by working together to map all possible trajectories and outcomes of disasters. It is only by doing this that communities, different levels of government, donors and humanitarian agencies will have a plan in place to deal with future floods, mudslides and other disasters.
Tione Mumbo Thindwa co-authored this article. She is the founder for Centre for Human Rights and Community Development, and researches gender, climate risk and politics in Malawi.
Simon Manda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
By Simon Manda, Lecturer in Global Development and Co-Director of the Centre for Global Development, University of Leeds
