The recent rerun election in Ablekuma North, which tragically descended into violence on Friday, July 11, 2025, was more than just a localized electoral dispute. It was a searing indictment of our collective failure to address the festering wound of political violence that continues to plague Ghana’s democratic process. While discussions rightly focus on implementing the Short Commission’s report, with its commendable recommendations for severe punishment, enhanced security, disbanding vigilante groups, and ballot digitization, these measures, though vital, regrettably skirt the central problem. The vicious cycle of violence we witness every election season is not merely a consequence of weak enforcement; it is a direct symptom of a profound and pervasive lack of trust in the Electoral Commission’s (EC) ability to conduct credible, transparent, and fair elections.
We must move beyond treating the symptoms and confront the root cause. The perpetrators of election violence are not inherently drawn to chaos or the suffering of others. Their actions are often driven by perceived incentives, such as financial gain, political opportunity, or the desperate belief that violence is the only means to safeguard their party’s interests. This suggests a demand for such actions from political candidates and top party leadership, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of electoral power. But why would politicians resort to such extreme measures? Perhaps to deter opponents, or more insidiously, to create an environment ripe for electoral manipulation. While violence might once have been seen as a deterrent, both major political parties now understand that it often begets counter-violence, failing to keep opponents from the polls. This leaves us with the chilling realization that the primary incentive for violence is the perceived need to “steal” or, as parties prefer to frame it, “protect the integrity of the ballots.”
During my dissertation research in Ghana in 2022, which involved extensive interviews with party activists from both major political parties, two issues consistently emerged as direct drivers of this “incentive to steal” and, consequently, election violence: an overwhelming lack of trust in the Electoral Commission and deep-seated suspicions of cheating by political opponents. The most common factor, repeatedly cited by individuals on both sides of the political divide, was a profound distrust in the EC and its polling officers to conduct credible and fair elections. Activists accused the EC of manipulating results in favor of the party that appointed them, perceiving the Commission and its officers as partial and compromised adjudicators of election outcomes.
This perception is not baseless. The EC’s past posture and its reluctance to readily provide its paperwork for verification, often demanding that parties produce their own first, has only exacerbated the problem. This stance, rather than fostering transparency, has inadvertently fueled vigilantism at polling stations, creating fertile ground for disputes to escalate into violence. It also draws unnecessary crowds to polling centers, setting the stage for chaos when disagreements inevitably arise.
The second critical reason party activists engage in election violence stems from the pervasive suspicion that their political opponents will steal elections if given the opportunity, coupled with the EC’s perceived failure to guarantee the protection of ballots.
Activists claim that polling officers, who are entrusted with safeguarding votes, are sometimes compromised, overtly sympathetic to a political party, or simply lack the knowledge and authority to enforce election rules effectively. Similarly, security officers, meant to intervene in cases of malpractice, often find themselves in analogous situations: compromised, sympathetic, overwhelmed, or unclear about the limits of their authority.
The tragic consequence is that party activists feel compelled to take matters into their own hands, to “be vigilant” and protect their votes, which frequently escalates into violence when disputes erupt between the two major parties. To compound this, the EC has repeatedly asserted in election disputes that “elections are won at polling stations,” implying that discrepancies at the polling unit cannot be rectified later. This dictum places immense pressure on political parties to police the electoral process on election day, often leading to clashes between supporters.
What then can be done to address these deeply ingrained concerns that trigger election violence among party activists in Ghana? Any effective solution must guarantee the integrity of the electoral process, which fundamentally begins with building trust and confidence in the Electoral Commission to conduct transparent, impartial, and fraud-free elections. Any approach that falls short of this central objective is unlikely to yield lasting peaceful polls.
I propose a bold, albeit unconventional, solution: politicizing the appointment of the EC team. The current principle of political neutrality, while theoretically sound, appears to be failing in practice. The EC team is appointed by the sitting President, whose party has a direct stake in the elections they administer. From the first EC team to the present, both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have accused the Commission of partisanship in favor of the appointing government. This perception of obligation and reciprocation is a critical trust deficit.
Specifically, I suggest that at least the EC Chair and the Second Deputy should be known, affiliated members of the NDC and the NPP. Knowing that they have a direct representative at the decision-making table, empowered to protect their interests, both major parties would have significantly less cause to worry about election results being manipulated. The Third Deputy could then be an unaffiliated person, nominated by the opposition and approved by a majority in Parliament. Since both political parties would have consented to this deputy’s appointment, concerns about favoritism would be minimized. This approach would necessitate a constitutional amendment, making it a crucial consideration within any ongoing constitutional review process.
Furthermore, the selection of polling officers should also be based on political affiliation. Similar to the permanent EC officers, polling teams should include at least one member from each of the two major political parties. In the current system, political parties deploy their agents to observe the electoral process. However, this merely allows observation and offers limited influence in decision-making, failing to address the fundamental trust issue that fuels violence. Having party members as part of the official polling officer team would not only boost the parties’ trust in the process but also ensure their representatives gain a clear, official understanding of election laws through the EC’s training.
The Ablekuma North violence is a stark warning. It tells us that superficial fixes will not suffice. To truly secure our democracy, we must address the crisis of trust at its core. By instituting a more transparent and representative EC, one that inherently fosters confidence through shared oversight, we can disarm the incentives for violence and pave the way for elections that are not only free and fair but also genuinely peaceful. This is not a radical departure from democratic principles, but a pragmatic adaptation to ensure their survival in Ghana.
